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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to determine whether the 
U.S. Army is adequately prepared or organizationally 
structured at the operational and tactical levels of warfare 
and command to execute synchronous information operations in 
light of recent doctrinal changes. Implementation of the new 
Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, will significantly 
affect the conduct of information and influence operations 
in the U.S. Army at the operational and tactical levels of 
warfare and command. Field Manual 3-0, published February 
27, 2008, revised how the Army views information operations 
and the staff responsibility for the tasks associated with 
them. U.S. Army information operations is now doctrinally 
divided into five Army information tasks, with the 
responsibility redistributed to different staff functional 
cells, ultimately to be synchronized by the operations 
process. The five Army information functional cells possess 
a reciprocal interdependence with each other, each providing 
inputs and feedback to the others. This study concludes that 
a lateral coordination process should be applied to the 
functional structure of the staff organization to accomplish 
information tasks. A direct liaison or full-time integrator 
role should be applied to the organization to integrate IO 
elements’ capabilities and related activities and in order 
to synchronize information activities. The combined 
performance and effectiveness of the staff organization 
requires a lateral process of coordination to synchronize 
the highly-interdependent information tasks. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND - THESIS OVERVIEW 
Advances in information technology have changed the way 
U.S. Army forces operate, just as it continues to change 
every aspect of our society. The impact and importance of 
the information dimension of Army operations will likely 
continue to increase given a continuance of the current 
operational landscape characterized by persistent global 
conflict and complex, decentralized threats.  
The Information Operations (IO) concept as envisioned 
by Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, 2001, and 
codified by FM 3-13, Information Operations: Doctrine, 
Tactics, Techniques and Procedures, 2003, synchronized 
several previously disparate information capabilities and 
related activities for the purpose of achieving and 
maintaining information superiority.  
While the 2001 version of FM 3-0 added information as 
an element of combat power, thus elevating the impact of the 
information dimension on the operational environment1, the  
 
 
                     
1  Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, 17 
September 2006, Change 1, 13 February 2008, (Washington, D.C.: Joint 
Staff, 2006), p. GL-22, 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_0.pdf (accessed 2/24/08). 
Operational environments are a composite of the conditions, 
circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities 
and bear on the decisions of the commander. While they include all 
enemy, adversary, friendly, and neutral systems across the spectrum of 
conflict, they also include an understanding of the physical 
environment, the state of governance, technology, local resources, and 
the culture of the local population. 
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2008 FM 3-0 revises how the Army views information 
operations and the staff responsibility for the tasks 
associated with them. 
 
Figure 1.   Joint Information Operations.2 
Implementation of the new FM 3-0, Operations, published 
February 27, 2008, will significantly affect the conduct of 
information and influence operations in the U.S. Army 
operationally and tactically. As Army Capstone Doctrine, the 
2008 FM 3-0 supersedes all subordinate operations doctrine, 
to include ‘information operations,’ doctrine.3 
Field Manual 3-0, 2008 has dictated that the former 
2003 concept of ‘information operations’ now be divided into 
five Army ‘information tasks,’ in regard to the work 
                     
2  Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-13, Information 
Operations, 13 February 2006, (Washington, D.C.: Joint Staff, 2006), p. 
ix, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_13.pdf (accessed 
3/6/08). Various definitions of Information Operations exist between 
previous and current Joint and Army doctrine. For the purpose of this 
thesis, the Joint definition will be used which has been adopted by the 
Army and supersedes the Army’s previous definition in the current-
standing FM 3-13, Information Operations, and further includes the 
Related Capability of Defense Support to Public Diplomacy as recognized 
in the new FM, 3-0, Operations.    
3  U.S. Army doctrine hierarchy is described in Chapter II. 
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required to operate within the information dimension of the 
operational environment. The responsibility for executing 
these information tasks has been distributed to independent 
staff functional cells, to be ultimately synchronized 
through the operations process. 
 
Figure 2.   Army Information Tasks.4 
                     
4  The 2008 FM 3-0 delineates five Army Information Tasks to leverage 
the power of information in full spectrum operations.  
Key:
G-2 Intelligence – Responsible for the production and dissemination of 
combat intelligence and counterintelligence matters. 
G-3 Operations and Training – Responsible for planning the successive 
military operations, organization, and training.
G-5 Plans – Responsible for the planning of future military operations and 
organization.
G-6 Communications – Responsible for Command, control, communications, and 
computer operations.
G-7 Information Operations – Responsible for employment of the core, 
specified and related capabilities of IO in support of achieving
Information Superiority.
G-9 Civil Military Operations – Responsible for establishing, maintaining 
and influencing relations between military forces and the civilian 
populace.
PSYOP Psychological Operations – Responsible for informing foreign 
audiences to influence their emotions in order to affect desired behavior.  
PA Public Affairs – Responsible for timely and accurate information 
dissemination to domestic and foreign audiences.
 4
The figure above aligns staff responsibilities for 
accomplishing and synchronizing the five Army information 
tasks. This alignment has been a matter of considerable 
discussion and debate. The highlighted ‘Staff 
Responsibility’ row, though approved by General Schoomaker 
and General Casey in their position as Army Chief of Staff 
in January 2007 and February 2008, respectively, was not 
included in the 2008 FM 3-0. It was decided that Information 
Tasks responsibility should be addressed at lower-level 
doctrine, presumably in the pending FM 5-0, The Operations 
Process, or a future FM 3-13, Information, rather than in FM 
3-0, the Army’s capstone operations doctrine. 
In Organization in Action, James D. Thompson describes 
three types of interdependence: pooled interdependence, 
where subtasks are performed separately and in any order; 
sequential interdependence, where subtasks are completed in 
a specified sequence; and, reciprocal interdependence, the 
highest form of interdependence, where the output of one 
coordination cell becomes the input for others.5 The 
combined performance and effectiveness of a staff 
‘organization’ operating in the information dimension may 
require a lateral process of coordination to synchronize the 
highly-interdependent information tasks. 
Each of the five Army information tasks possess an 
inherent reciprocal interdependence to the other tasks as 
they cumulatively shape the information dimension of the 
operational environment. Specifically, in the execution of 
an information campaign in a theater of operations, the 
                     
5  James D. Thompson, Organizations in Action: Social Science Bases 
of Administrative Theory (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), pp. 45-55, 52-
53, 55-56.  
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output of one staff functional cell responsible for one 
information task could likely become the input to another 
cell accountable for another information task. This task 
interdependence that exists between the functional 
coordination cells’ work requires effective coordination and 
problem solving. In turn, cross-unit coordination can be 
effectively achieved through lateral relationships or 
coordination mechanisms.6 
To achieve the effectiveness of the staff to positively 
affect the information dimension of the operational 
environment, the Army can organize operational and tactical 
staffs by the designs dictated in recent doctrine:  
1. FM 3-0, Operations, 2008  
The U.S. Army’s new capstone Operations doctrine 
asserts that all operations should be conceived in terms of 
affecting the human will and decision making as their 
ultimate purpose. The field manual invokes the supremacy of 
the moral dimension in conflict and the imperative to 
consider all operational aspects of the environment as a 
unity from inception through conclusion. Capitalizing on 
this unity begins with identifying those cognitive effects 
likely to produce the desired end state, and then designing 
an operation with physical actions, words, and images 
synchronized to best advance the desired outcomes. In this 
design, commanders are directly responsible for 
informational and cognitive effects as such effects are the 
cornerstone of their battle command. In accordance with    
                     
6  Jay R. Galbraith, Designing Complex Organizations (Reading, Mass.: 
Addison-Wesley Pub. Co, 1973). 
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FM 3-0, 2008, the responsibility for coordinating the five 
Army information tasks and their corresponding capabilities 
rests with the staff principals operating in the functional 
coordination cells. The responsibility of the G/S-7 
Information Operations Officer, is not to laterally 
coordinate all of the IO capabilities, but is limited to 
synchronizing information engagement activities as the staff 
lead for Army Information Task 1, Information Engagement, in 
concert with all other operational activities. 
The responsibility for laterally coordinating the 
designated five Army information tasks and their 
corresponding capabilities are to be assigned to the 
accountable staff principals who already possess like 
capabilities, capacity, and knowledge in the organization. 
This design assumes that the staff principals use their 
corresponding functional coordinating cells to integrate 
these highly-interdependent information activities, and then 
relies on the operations process to laterally coordinate the 
activities between functional cells and into plans, orders, 
and synchronous military operations. 
2. FM 3-0, Operations, 2001, and FM 3-13, Information 
Operations, 2003  
The previous concept of the Information Environment as 
found in the 2001 FM 3-0 asserts there is a qualitative and 
categorical difference between combat operations and 
“information operations,” at least as far as staff proponent 
tasks are concerned. It contends that operations are focused 
on operational objectives, which may or may not be 
“cognitive.” The role of the Information Operations Officer 
in this design is to estimate the required information tasks 
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associated with the operational environment and develop 
courses of action with the IO capabilities that the 
commander would incorporate to achieve his objectives. In 
other words, the G/S-7 is the accountable staff principal 
who synchronizes information activities derived from his 
training, knowledge, and expertise of the full range of IO 
capabilities and related activities. 
Some military information professionals who supported 
the organizational design of the 2001 FM 3-0 during the 
Information and Cyberspace Symposium7 acknowledged that the 
older approach is not the most advantageous, but believe 
some form of lateral control should be retained, 
nonetheless, until the Army develops an intrinsic 
understanding of the power of information and the competency 
to apply that power as instinctively as it does fires and 
maneuver.  
The two doctrinal concepts reflect two different ways 
of thinking and understanding the role of information in the 
contemporary operational environment and the integrating 
mechanisms necessary to synchronize required information 
tasks. The new FM 3-0 has directed the Army towards a 
command-centric view requiring the contribution of the 
entire team to achieve the potential of information as a 
unity with all operational activity in full spectrum 
operations. The challenge is that the 2001 FM 3-0 design is 
                     
7  The U.S. Army Combined Arms Center hosted the Information and 
Cyberspace Symposium at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 15–18 April 2008. The 
symposium was attended by the author of this thesis and 135 other 
information practitioners and leaders from the national security 
community. A series of plenary sessions and workshops were used to 
determine, among other initiatives, the way ahead for publishing the 
necessary update to FM 3-13, Information, given the changes regarding 
information tasks in the newly-published FM 3-0, Operations. 
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rather common in current practice particularly at the 
operational and tactical levels of Army warfare and command. 
The two organizational designs offer two ways in which 
to synchronize information activities with other operational 
activities and to integrate the result into the operations 
process. However, the two designs should not be considered 
contradictory. As this research asserts, it is important to 
integrate words and deeds than to integrate the employment 
of IO capabilities into one line of operation, yet, the 
combined performance and effectiveness of the staff 
organization’ may require a simple or complex form of 
lateral coordination to synchronize the reciprocal 
interdependent information tasks. The operations process, 
alone, may not be able to provide that coordination due to 
the current task overload of the staff organization.  
This study hypothesizes that there is a need for an 
Army information task manager to oversee the lateral 
coordination of the information tasks into operational 
planning and execution. This IO specialist would be the 
responsible staff principal who synchronizes information 
activities, derived from expertise of the IO elements’ 
capabilities, capacity, and related IO activities, and given 
the reciprocal interdependence of the information tasks. In 
short, the combined performance and effectiveness of the 
staff organization requires this form of lateral 
coordination to synchronize the interdependent information 
tasks. 
 9
B. PURPOSE, SCOPE, AND METHOD OF THIS STUDY 
1. Purpose 
Information is elemental to military power. It enables 
commanders and other leaders to effectively execute the six 
warfighting functions.8 Commanders use information to: 
develop a common situational understanding, to enable battle 
command; and, to affect the operational environment. 
The purpose of this thesis is to determine whether the 
U.S. Army is adequately prepared and organizationally 
structured at the operational and tactical levels of warfare 
and command to execute synchronous information tasks in 
light of recent doctrinal changes. Given the reciprocal 
interdependence of the U.S. Army’s doctrinal ‘information 
tasks,’ this thesis hypothesizes that there is a need for a 
centralized Army information task lateral coordinator to 
oversee the coordination and synchronization of the 
information tasks into operational planning and execution.  
2. Scope 
The scope of this thesis is limited to information 
activities conducted at the U.S. Army Operational and 
Tactical levels of warfare and command: 
                     
8  Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-0, Operations, 27 February 
2008, (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2008), 
pp. 4-3 - 4-7, 
https://akocomm.us.army.mil/usapa/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_aa/pdf/fm3_0.pdf 
(accessed 5/15/08). A warfighting function is a group of tasks and 
systems (people, organizations, information, and processes) united by a 
common purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions and training 
objectives. 
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The Operational level is the level of war at which 
campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and 
sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters 
or operational areas. Activities at this level link tactics 
and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed 
to accomplish the strategic objectives, sequencing events to 
achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and 
applying resources to bring about and sustain these events. 
These activities imply a broader dimension of time or space 
than do tactics and they ensure the logistic and 
administrative support of tactical forces, and provide the 
means by which tactical successes are exploited to achieve 
strategic objectives.9 
The Tactical level of war is the level at which battles 
and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish 
military objectives assigned to tactical units or task 
forces. Activities at this level focus on the ordered 
arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to 
each other and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives.10 
3. Method 
In preparation for the work on this thesis, I reviewed 
a significant body of academic and professional research on 
the structure and behavior of Army organizations at the 
operational and tactical levels of warfare and planning. 
Evidence was gathered from organizational documentation, 
                     
9  Department of the Army, Field Manual 1-02, Operational Terms and 
Graphics, 21 September, 2004, (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, 
Department of the Army, 2004), pp. 1-138 - 1-139, 
https://akocomm.us.army.mil/usapa/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_aa/pdf/fm1_02.pdf 
(accessed 5/21/08). 
10  Ibid., p. 1-182. 
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organizational archival records, and direct observation. As 
the organizational precepts of the 2008 FM 3-0 have not been 
fully saturated and implemented, some assumptions have been 
made as to how Army units at the tactical and operational 
levels of command will interpret the doctrinal guidance. Set 
against the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) and 
analyzed through the degree of lateral processes between the 
doctrinal functional cells responsible for information 
tasks, evaluative criteria will be derived from subjective 
friction points inherent in nominating and synchronizing 
information tasks during the operations process. The 2008 FM 
3-0 organizational design to affect the information 
dimension will be evaluated for its effectiveness to 
laterally coordinate numerous information tasks. A hybrid 
model combining the beneficial aspects of the 2008 and 2001 
organizational designs will be introduced that hypothesizes 
that information tasks can best be synchronized and 
accomplished by the assistance of an information task 
coordinator, either the existing G/S-7 Information 
Operations officer, or a designated G/S-3 liaison. 
C. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
The thesis is organized into five chapters. Chapter I 
is the introduction where the thesis purpose is identified. 
This is preceded by a brief discussion of the mission and 
tasks of information operations assigned by the Department 
of Defense and formalized in Joint and U.S. Army 
publications. Additional examples are provided to illustrate 
symptoms of desynchronized information operations that can 
negatively affect military operations. Finally, the scope of  
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the thesis limits the research to organizations executing 
information tasks at the operational and tactical levels of 
Army warfare and command. 
Chapter II provides the reader a brief literature 
review regarding the relationship between U.S. Army 
Missions, Operations, and Tasks. The integration of Army 
information tasks into the operations process, as well as a 
Joint and Army Doctrine description, and the inherent 
flexibility of Commanders to accomplish their mission within 
the parameters of doctrine will be explored. 
In Chapter III, the Army information tasks are placed 
into the context of FM 3-0 and the execution of those tasks 
by the information functional coordination cells of 
responsibility. Descriptions of each coordination cell and 
each of their information capabilities are identified in 
this chapter.  
Chapter IV provides the reader an understanding of 
organizational design and introduces a combined open systems 
model developed for this analysis. This chapter builds upon 
previously introduced precepts of how the U.S. Army 
accomplishes information tasks at the operational and 
tactical levels of warfare and planning. Set against the 
Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) and analyzed through 
the degree of lateral processes between the functional cells 
responsible for information tasks, evaluative criteria will 
be derived from subjective friction points inherent in 
nominating and synchronizing information tasks during the 
operations process. The 2008 FM 3-0 organizational design 
will be evaluated for its effectiveness to laterally 
coordinate information tasks. Determining how the various 
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components in an organization that are responsible for 
information tasks interact and adapt to achieve the output 
goal is an objective of this chapter.  
Finally, Chapter V contains observations from the 
lateral processes analysis and provides recommendations for 
organizing Army operational and tactical units executing 
information tasks. The hypothesis contends that a hybrid of 
the 2008 FM 3-0 organizational design and its 2001 
predecessor’s design will best synchronize the 
accomplishment of the interdependent information tasks, 
producing a structural arrangement that will be most 
effective in incorporating information tasks into the 
complex operational environment. 
The hybrid model will be further analyzed that contends 
that information tasks can best be synchronized and 
accomplished by the assistance of an information task 
coordinator, the existing G/S-7 Information Operations 
Officer, or by a chosen G/S-3 liaison. These recommendations 
are necessarily limited and are suggestive. They are based 
on limited resources and a moderate level of knowledge of 
training procedures and mission requirements. However, they 
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II. U.S. ARMY MISSIONS, OPERATIONS, AND TASKS  
This chapter provides a brief literature review 
regarding the relationship between U.S. Army Missions, 
Operations, and Tasks. The integration of Army information 
tasks into the operations process, as well as a Joint and 
Army Doctrine description, and the inherent flexibility of 
Commanders to accomplish their mission within the 
parameters of doctrine will be explored. 
A. MISSION, OPERATION, AND TASK RELATIONSHIP 
An Army mission establishes the requirement to perform 
tasks and provides the context for each task performance, to 
include the conditions under which a task must be performed.  
It determines where and when a task must be performed. 
Finally, it determines the degree to which a task must be 
performed, as stated in the concept of the operation, and 
provides a way to understand precisely how the performance 
of a task contributes to mission success. 
Full spectrum operations is the term of the Army’s 
operational concept. The components of full spectrum 
operations are offense, defense, stability, and civil 
support. The operational concept, portrayed in the figure 
below, is the foundation for all Army doctrine. The goal of 
full spectrum operations is to enable the Army to defeat an 
enemy on land and establish the conditions that attains the 




Figure 3.   The Army’s Operational Concept.11 
Understanding the relationship of mission, operation, 
and task is important to the successful synchronization of 
Army informational tasks. The mission establishes the 
requirement to perform tasks and provides the context for 
each task performance, including the conditions under which 
a task must be performed. It determines where and when a 
task must be performed and further determines the degree to 
which a task must be performed in accordance with the 
concept of the operation. 
The synchronization between mission, operation, and 
tasks is coordinated through mission analysis and subsequent 
steps of the Military Decision Making Process. The product 
of the analysis is the identification of operations and the 
                     
11 Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-0, Operations, 27 February 
2008, p. 3-1. 
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physical, informational, and cognitive tasks that must be 
performed in a synchronistical manner for mission success. 
 
Figure 4.   Relationship of Missions, Operations, and Tasks.12 
The Army’s operational concept is the core of its 
doctrine and that doctrine drives the mission analysis and 
execution of a plan, such as informational or influence 
operations. Doctrine is a guide to action, not hard and fast 
rules. Doctrine provides a common frame of reference across 
the military. It helps standardize operations, facilitating 
readiness by establishing common ways of accomplishing 
military tasks. 
B. INTEGRATING ARMY INFORMATION TASKS INTO THE OPERATIONS 
PROCESS 
Conducting operations that influence the enemy’s will 
to fight is as old as warfare itself. Information Operations 
have been applied throughout military history, and its 
                     
12 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Manual CJCSM 3500.04C, Universal Joint Task List (UJTL), 1 July 2002, 




present application continues to grow as the U.S. increases 
its reliance on information as a weapon and commodity. 
Psychological operations, operations security, military 
deception, physical destruction, and electronic warfare were 
viable tools of Army commanders during World War II. The 
Gulf War demonstrated the benefit of employing these 
elements together and synchronizing them with ground 
operations.   
In the 1990s, a concept called Information Operations 
(or Information Warfare) began to take hold, first in the 
Joint community and then in the U.S. Army. U.S. Operations 
in the Balkans posed renewed challenges to the US military 
as it strove to change attitudes and perceptions of 
combatant and non-combatants as the military enforced United 
Nations and NATO mandates concerning Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Kosovo. 
The shaping operations conducted during this period of 
military operations included targeting key leaders on both 
sides to modify behaviors prior to critical events such as 
elections. The maneuver forces received some IO-capable 
assets to non-kinetically influence local leaders and the 
population. Some of the assets employed were tactical 
psychological operations teams, public affairs detachments, 
civil affairs teams, combat camera teams, medical treatment 
teams, unit commanders, and patrols. The continual use of IO 
in an integrated manner with maneuver operations proved 
successful in shaping the operational environment and 
defusing several potentially volatile situations. 
Visualizing the information domain through standard military 
procedures such as the Military Decision Making Process 
 19
(MDMP), Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB), 
and targeting was effective in the overall success of 
operations.13  
The Army codified the concept of Information Operations 
– the act of protecting and using information while denying 
the enemy the ability to do the same – in the 1996 edition 
of FM 100-6, Information Operations.14 Subsequently in 1999, 
the Army created the Information Operations Career Field to 
provide commanders with a dedicated IO staff to ensure units 
plan and execute IO in a coordinated manner. Officers are 
typically assessed while at the rank of captain from one of 
many Army branches, for example Armor, Infantry, Field 
Artillery, and designated Functional Area 30 (FA30) 
Information Operations officers. Currently, there is one 
required training course, the twelve-week IO Officer 
Qualification Course at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.15  
In 2001, FM 3-0, Operations, first designated 
information as an element of combat power. U.S. Army 
Information Operations is the employment of the core 
capabilities of electronic warfare (EW), computer network 
operations (CNO), psychological operations (PSYOP), military 
                     
13 Marc J. Romanych, “Tactical Information Operations in Kosovo,” 
Military Review (September-October, 2004), 
www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/milreview/romanych.pdf (accessed 
6/17/2008). 
14 Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-6, Information 
Operations, 27 August 1996, (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department 
of the Army, 1996), 
http://www.iwar.org.uk/iwar/resources/usarmyio/fm100-6.pdf (accessed 
5/16/08). 
15 U.S. Army Information Operations Proponent, U.S. Army Combined 
Arms Center, Fact Sheet: Functional Area 30 Qualification Course (FA30 
QC), 15 October 2008, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Combined Arms 
Center, 2008). 
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deception (MILDEC), and operations security (OPSEC), in 
concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, 
to include Public Affairs (PA) and Civil Affairs (CA) to 
affect or defend information and information systems, and to 
influence decisionmaking.16  
IO is particularly relevant in irregular warfare 
because it is used to influence populations, which are the 
center of gravity in an insurgency.  Colonel Ralph O. Baker, 
a Brigade Combat Team Commander in Operation Iraqi Freedom 
with responsibilities in a volatile area of Baghdad, 
discussed the significant role of IO in Operation Iraqi 
Freedom: 
IO was going to be one of the most vital tools 
(along with human intelligence) I would need to be 
successful in a counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign.  
COIN operations meant competing daily to favorably 
influence the perceptions of the Iraqi population in 
our area of operations.17 
Army IO officers are the supporting staff who plan, 
implement, and assess information tasks for combat units in 
Iraq from Multi-National Force - Iraq down to the battalion 
level. Though under-resourced and still being developed, the 
Army IO organization will bear greater responsibility for 
the success or failure of information dominance and 
                     
16 Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-13, Information Operations: 
Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, 28 November 2003, 




17 Ralph O. Baker, “The Decisive Weapon: A Brigade Combat Team 
Commander’s Perspective on Information Operations.” Military Review 
(May-June, 2006), p. 13, 
http://www.army.mil/professionalwriting/volumes/volume4/july_2006/7_06_3
.html (accessed 6/17/2008). 
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influence in military operations by enabling commanders to 
use and integrate IO into all operations. 
The 2008 edition of FM 3-0 reaffirms that “In modern 
conflict, information has become as important as lethal 
action in determining the outcome of operations”18 and that 
commanders must integrate information “in full spectrum 
operations as carefully as fires, maneuver, protection and 
sustainment.”19 
C. INFORMATION OPERATIONS OBJECTIVE 
The objective of the employment of Army IO is to gain 
and maintain Information Superiority,20 a condition that 
allows commanders to seize, retain, and exploit the 
initiative. It facilitates more effective decisionmaking and 
faster execution. IO involve constant efforts to deny 
adversaries the ability to detect and respond to friendly 
operations, while simultaneously retaining and enhancing 
friendly force freedom of action. When expeditiously 
exploited, IO provides a potent advantage that facilitates 
rapid military success with minimal casualties. Effective IO 
and information management allow commanders to take 
advantage of opportunities, while denying adversary 
                     
18 Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-0, Operations, 27 February 
2008, p. 4-3. 
19 Ibid., p. 7-1. 
20 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of 
Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001, as Amended through 30 May 
2008, (Washington, D.C.: Joint Staff, 2001), p. 262, 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf (accessed 4/23/08). 
Information Superiority is the operational advantage derived from the 
ability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of 
information while exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do the 
same. 
 22
commanders the information needed to make timely and 
accurate decisions or leading them to make decisions 
favorable to friendly forces.   
Commanders do not conduct IO simply for the sake of 
doing IO. Effective IO is an integrated effort that 
synchronizes the effects of IO elements and related 
activities to accomplish specific objectives designated by 
the commander. It is the means commanders use to mass the 
effects of the information element of combat power. 
Focused IO, synchronized with effective information 
management and intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance, enable commanders to gain and maintain 
information superiority.21 IO is a prime means for achieving 
information superiority, the operational advantage achieved 
by an uninterrupted flow of information while denying the 
enemy’s ability to do the same.22 
Information operations are characterized as offensive 
or defensive in nature. The Army defines offensive 
information operations as “the integrated use of assigned 
and supporting capabilities and activities, mutually 
supported by intelligence, to affect enemy decision makers 
or to influence others to achieve or promote specific 
objectives.” Army doctrine allows for commanders to use all 
elements of IO offensively. Defensive information operations 
are “the integration and coordination of policies and 
procedures, operations, personnel, and technology to protect 
                     
21 Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-0, Operations, 27 February 
2008, p. 7-1. 
22 Ibid., p. 7-1. 
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and defend friendly information and information systems.”23 
In the current global, information dimension; maneuver 
units, with the assistance of IO trained officers, should 
look to incorporate offensive and defensive information 
operations daily into the mission. Not just as an 
afterthought. 
D. DOCTRINAL FRAMEWORK 
The term “doctrine,” as a military concept, has an 
expansive meaning. Knowledge and understanding of doctrine 
are essential for effective operations on the battlefield. 
Doctrine provides the framework and principles to cope with 
the unexpected. Moreover, it provides a common language and 
perspective so leaders can communicate effectively with one 
another. 
Consider the following discussion of doctrine contained 
in the 2008 FM 3-0:  
Ours is a doctrinally-based Army. FM 3-0 provides 
the intellectual underpinnings that lie at the core 
of how our Army will organize, train, equip, and 
conduct operations in this new environment…24 
Doctrine is a guide to action, not a set of fixed 
rules. It combines history, an understanding of the 
operational environment, and assumptions about 
future conditions to help leaders think about how 
best to accomplish missions.25 
                     
23 Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-13, Information Operations: 
Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, 28 November 2003, pp. 1-
14 - 1-18. 
24 Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-0, Operations, 27 February 
2008, Foreword. 
25 Ibid., p. D-1. 
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Military doctrine is the concise expression of how 
military forces contribute to campaigns, major operations, 
battles, and engagements. Doctrine provides a common frame 
of reference for independent and interdependent tasks across 
the military. It helps standardize operations, facilitating 
readiness by establishing common ways of accomplishing 
military tasks, such as informational and influence tasks. 
Doctrine influences all aspects of the U.S. military. 
It provides a common language and a common understanding of 
how the U.S. Armed Forces conduct operations. Doctrine, like 
history, requires significant analysis and elucidation 
before it is written and accepted, which takes time. 
Doctrine is evolutionary. However, when it is written and 
published it should represent the military’s best guess of 
how our leaders and soldiers should approach warfighting. 
This description of the function of doctrine in the U.S. 
military builds upon similarly accepted conceptions of 
doctrine still held by commentators today:  
Doctrine is an approved, shared idea about the 
conduct of warfare that undergirds an army’s 
planning, organization, training, leadership style, 
tactics, weapons, and equipment. These activities in 
preparation for future war lie at the heart of the 
military profession in modern societies. When well-
conceived and clearly articulated, doctrine can 
instill confidence throughout an army. An army’s 
doctrine, therefore, can have the most profound 
effect on its performance in war.26 
                     
26 Paul H. Herbert and U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 
Combat Studies Institute, Deciding What Has to be Done: General William 
E. DePuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5, Operations, Vol. 16 (Fort 
Leavenworth, Kan.: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and 




Joint Forces doctrine provides a common language and a 
common understanding of how the Armed Forces conduct 
operations, and it is applicable to the joint staff, 
commanders of combatant commands, sub-unified commands, 
joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands, 
and the Services, to include the U.S. Army. Army doctrine 
continues the continuity by providing a common understanding 
of how Army forces conduct operations.   
E. U.S. ARMY DOCTRINE 
Army doctrine is designed to be detailed enough to 
guide operations, yet flexible enough to allow commanders to 
exercise initiative when dealing with specific tactical and 
operational situations. Recent transformations of U.S. Army 
organizations necessitated transforming the doctrine that 
supports their tactical and operational-level tasks and 
functions. 
The Army has two Capstone Field Manuals — FM 1, The 
Army, and FM 3-0, Operations — that form the apex of the 
Army’s doctrine hierarchy. Together, they establish the 
framework for a range of supporting doctrine. Army keystone 
doctrine is organized around foundations established in FM 
3-0. Supporting manuals provide additional detail for 
keystone manuals.  
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Figure 5.   The Tier 1 Army Doctrine Hierarchy.27 
The Army’s Field Manual numbering system, which mirrors 
the Joint system, aligns Army doctrine with Joint doctrine. 
The Army’s warfighting doctrine is structured into a two-
tiered hierarchy to provide for development and 
implementation of Army doctrinal publications. Tier 1 is the 
highest-level, with the majority of the field manuals 
directly linked to Joint doctrine as indicated by a parallel 
numbering system. In addition to the capstone publications 
FM 1 and FM 3-0, approximately 48 other Tier 1 FMs and 
                     
27 Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G8, 
2007 Army Modernization Plan (Washington D.C.: Office of the Deputy 




supporting publications offer broad perspectives on Army 
operations in Joint campaigns. Tier 2 Doctrine, comprised of 
550 FMs, capture the bulk of proponent, lower-level 
organizational FMs, most of which are narrower in scope than 
Tier 1 FMs. 
As a Capstone Field Manual, FM 3-0 establishes the 
Army’s fundamental principles for applying land power as 
part of an interdependent joint force. It provides a 
framework for action and decision making at all levels. The 
aim is to establish guidelines for leaders to direct 
operations while allowing enough freedom for bold, creative 
initiative in any situation. As Tier 1 doctrine, FM 3-13, 
Information Operations, is the Army’s overarching IO 
publication that was built on the foundation set in the 2001 
FM 3-0’s Chapter 11, “Information Superiority,” but is now 
subordinate to the new ideas of Information Superiority as 
set my the 2008 FM 3-0.  
F. CONCLUSION 
The Army’s adherence the present doctrine, to include 
the 2008 FM 3-0 is non-negotiable. Yet, Army doctrine is 
designed to be detailed enough to guide operations, yet 
flexible enough to allow commanders to organize their staffs 
as they see most advantageous to gain the initiative when 
dealing with specific tactical and operational situations. 
Commanders’ retain the authority to organize their staffs 
and their functions within the parameters of Army doctrine.   
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III. U.S. ARMY INFORMATION TASKS  
Building on the literature review, Joint and Army 
Doctrine description, and the integration of Army 
information tasks into the operations process, this chapter 
explains how the Army information tasks are placed into the 
context of the 2008 FM 3-0 and the execution of those tasks 
by the functional coordination cells of responsibility. 
Descriptions of each coordination cell and each of their 
information capabilities are identified in this chapter.  
A. FUNCTIONAL COORDINATION CELLS 
As the collection of the Core, Supporting and Related 
information capabilities, the term ‘Information Operations’ 
has fallen out of favor in the U.S. Army. The contention 
stems from the fact that information operations and its 
constituents are considered an aggregated whole of the 
capabilities that were previously well-established and were 
previously treated as largely independent.  
Meanwhile, Joint Doctrine still defines information 
operations as the Core, Supporting and Related capabilities 
of information operations.28 The five core capabilities are 
Psychological Operations (PSYOP), Military Deception 
(MILDEC), Operational Security (OPSEC), Electronic Warfare 
(EW), and Computer Network Operations (CNO). The first three 
core capabilities have long existed as part of military 
operations and the latter two have recently been integrated 
into contemporary military operations. The capabilities 
                     
28 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-13, Information 
Operations, February 13 2006. 
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supporting information operations include information 
assurance (IA), physical security, physical attack, 
counterintelligence (CI), and combat camera (COMCAM), and 
are seen as directly or indirectly involved in shaping the 
information dimension of the operational environment. The 
related capabilities constitute public affairs (PA), civil-
military operations (CMO), and defense support for public 
diplomacy (DSPD). The core capabilities are applicable at 
all levels of warfare, tactical, operational and strategic, 
whereas the supporting capabilities dominate the operational 
and the tactical levels and the related capabilities 
dominate the strategic and the operational levels.  
Army doctrine uses the joint definition of “information 
operations” as well as all of the capabilities that compose 
IO; however, Army doctrine categorizes IO capabilities 
differently from joint doctrine. Army doctrine describes 
affecting the Information Dimension of the Operational 
Environment in terms of five IO tasks:  
o Information Engagement  
o Command and Control Warfare  
o Information Protection 
o Operations Security 
o Military Deception  
Responsibilities for information operations tasks are 
as follows:  
o Information Engagement – Information Engagement Cell 
o Command and Control Warfare – Fires Cell 
o Information Protection – C4OPS Cell 
o Operations Security – Protection Cell 
o Military Deception – Plans Cell 
While this chapter briefly discusses the execution of 
the five IO tasks by the individual proponents and 
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capabilities in each of the respective functional 
coordination cells as codified in the 2008 FM 3-0, a 
comprehensive description of each of the functional 
coordination cell members and capabilities, previously 
defined as IO core, supporting and related capabilities, can 
be found in the Appendix. 
 
Figure 6.   Army Information Tasks.29 
B. INFORMATION ENGAGEMENT FUNCTIONAL COORDINATION CELL 
Information engagement is the ‘Integrated employment of 
public affairs to inform U.S. and friendly audiences; 
                     
29 Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate (CADD), Army Doctrine Update, 
24 February 2007 (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: US Army Combined Arms 
Center, 2007), 
http://asc.army.mil/docs/transformation/Army_Doctrine_Update_FM501_FM30.
pdf (accessed 8/20/08). 
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psychological operations, combat camera, U.S. Government 
strategic communication and defense support to public 
diplomacy, and other means necessary to influence foreign 
audiences; and, leader and Soldier engagements to support 
both efforts.’30 The Information Engagement Functional 
Coordination Cell is charged with synchronizing a consistent 
information engagement strategy that communicates 
information, builds trust and confidence, influences 
perceptions and behavior, and promotes support for Army, 
coalition and partnered host nation security forces. The 
staff proponents and capabilities of the Information 
Engagement Cell include: Leader and Soldier Engagement, 
Public Affairs (PA), Psychological Operations (PSYOP), 
Combat Camera (COMCAM), and ‘Strategic Communication and 
Defense Support to Public Diplomacy.’ The primary staff 
responsibility for the conduct of the Information Engagement 
functional cell is the G/S-7 Information Operations Officer 
with Public Affairs, PSYOP and G/S-9 Civil Affairs support 
within the information engagement cell. 
C. COMMAND AND CONTROL WARFARE FUNCTIONAL COORDINATION 
CELL 
Command and control warfare is ‘The integrated use of 
physical attack, electronic warfare, and computer network 
operations, supported by intelligence, to degrade, destroy, 
and exploit the adversary’s command and control system or to 
deny information to it.’31 The staff proponents and 
capabilities of the Command and Control Warfare Cell 
                     
30 Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-0, Operations, 27 February 
2008, pp. 7-3 - 7-5. 
31 Ibid., p. 7-6. 
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include: ‘Physical Attack,’ Electronic Attack (EA), 
Electronic warfare Support (ES), Computer Network Attack 
(CNA), and Computer Network Exploitation (CNE). The primary 
staff responsibility for the conduct of the Command and 
Control Warfare functional cell is the G/S-3 Operations 
Officer with G/S-2 Intelligence Officer support within the 
fires cell. 
D. INFORMATION PROTECTION FUNCTIONAL COORDINATION CELL 
Information Protection is the ‘Active or passive 
measures that protect and defend friendly information and 
information systems to ensure timely, accurate, and relevant 
friendly information. It denies enemies, adversaries, and 
others the opportunity to exploit friendly information and 
information systems for their own purposes.’32 The staff 
proponents and capabilities of the Information Protection 
Cell include: Information Assurance (IA), Computer Network 
Defense (CND), and Electronic Protection (EP). The primary 
staff responsibility for the conduct of the Information 
Protection functional cell is the G/S-6 Communications 
Officer within the Network Operations Cell. 
E. OPERATIONS SECURITY FUNCTIONAL COORDINATION CELL 
Operations security identifies essential elements of 
friendly information and evaluates the risk of compromise if 
an adversary or enemy obtains that information. This 
analysis compares the capabilities of hostile intelligence 
systems with the activities and communications of friendly 
                     
32 Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-0, Operations, 27 February 
2008, p. 7-7. 
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forces and friendly information vulnerabilities. The 
analysis focuses on critical information that an adversary 
could interpret or piece together in time to be useful. Once 
identified, operations security experts prioritize friendly 
vulnerabilities and recommend countermeasures and other 
means of reducing the vulnerability.33 The staff proponents 
and capabilities of the Operations Security Cell include: 
Operations Security (OPSEC), Physical Security, and 
Counterintelligence (CI). The primary staff responsibility 
for the conduct of the Operations Security functional cell 
is the G/S-3 Operations Officer with G/S-2 Intelligence 
Officer support within the protection cell. 
F. MILITARY DECEPTION FUNCTIONAL COORDINATION CELL 
At its most successful, military deception provokes an 
enemy commander to commit a serious mistake that friendly 
forces can exploit, there or elsewhere. However, effective 
military deception also introduces uncertainty into the 
enemy’s estimate of the situation, and that doubt can lead 
to hesitation. Deception is a good means of dislocating an 
enemy force in time and space. Military deception can 
contribute significantly to information superiority; 
however, it requires integration into the overall operation 
beginning with receipt of mission.34 
MILDEC in the information domain is quite different 
from the traditional or conventional MILDEC that involved 
the fusing of deception with physical tangibles on the 
ground; in the information age, MILDEC may achieve success 
                     
33 Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-0, Operations, 27 February 
2008, p. 7-7. 
34 Ibid., p. 7-7. 
 35
by shaping the information without too much reliance on 
commensurate actions in the physical domain. This ability to 
move away from traditional employment of MILDEC could allow 
it to be better integrated in information operation 
campaigns against terrorist organizations and networks. The 
importance of understanding the adversary’s ‘collection 
systems and sensors,’ to absorb deception, and to correctly 
assess their attitudes and reactions, is an essential 
ingredient for a successful MILDEC operation. 
The staff proponents and capabilities of the Military 
Deception Cell could include a cross-section of the entire 
staff, as MILDEC operations are planned and subjected to the 
same operations process as legitimate operations. The 
primary staff responsibility for the conduct of the Military 
Deception functional cell is the G/S-5 Plans Officer within 
the plans cell. 
G. CONCLUSION 
The responsibility for executing the five Army 
information tasks now rests within each of the staff 
functional cells. When properly integrated, IO can 
facilitate and enhance military operations across the 
operational spectrum. Properly employed and laterally 
coordinated, information operations can conserve limited 
resources, reduce operational risk, and significantly 
enhance Army mission accomplishment. Improperly 
coordinated, unintended consequences can create an 
organizational climate “where risk aversion dominates 
decisionmaking related to information tasks.”35 
                     
35 Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-0, Operations, 27 February 
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IV. ARMY INFORMATION TASKS INTEGRATION 
This chapter builds upon previously introduced precepts 
of how the U.S. Army accomplishes information tasks at the 
Operational and Tactical levels of warfare and planning. Set 
against the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) and 
analyzed through the degree of lateral processes between the 
functional cells responsible for information tasks, 
evaluative criteria will be derived from subjective friction 
points inherent in nominating and synchronizing information 
tasks during the operations process. The 2008 FM 3-0 
organizational design will be evaluated for its 
effectiveness to laterally coordinate these information 
tasks.  
A. THE MILITARY DECISION MAKING PROCESS (MDMP) 
The new 2008 FM 3-0 has dictated that the former 
concept of information operations now be divided into five 
Army information tasks, in regard to the work required to 
operate within the information dimension of the operational 
environment. The responsibility for executing these 
information tasks has been distributed to independent staff 
functional cells, to be ultimately synchronized through the 
operations process.36 
The ‘operations process’ refers to the Military 
Decision Making Process (MDMP). MDMP is the current 
doctrinal framework to decision making and planning at the 
operational and tactical levels and it represents an 
                     
36 Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-0, Operations, 27 February 
2008, pp. 7-2 - 7-3. 
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analytical approach to problem solving through the concerted 
efforts of the commander and his staff. The decision maker 
is the central MDMP element, yet it is a multidimensional 
undertaking involving the decision maker, the operational 
environment, organization, planning, learning and 
procedures.37 
As defined in the current FM 5-0, Army Planning and 
Orders Production, the military decision making process “is 
a planning model that establishes procedures for analyzing a 
mission, developing, analyzing, and comparing courses of 
action against criteria of success and each other, selecting 
the optimum course of action, and producing a plan or 
order.”38 In short, the MDMP is a seven-step analytical 
process. Beginning with Step 1, Receipt of Mission, and 
continuing through Step 7, Orders Production, the MDMP is 
the established doctrinal framework for problem solving used 
by staff organizations at the operational and tactical 
levels of warfare. As shown in the chart below, the MDMP 
considers input and analysis from across the staff to inform 
the commander of what he needs to make a decision as to how 
best to solve a problem.39 
                     
37 Christopher R. Paparone, “US Army Decisionmaking: Past, Present 
and Future,” Military Review (July-August, 2001), p. 48. 
38 Department of the Army, Field Manual 5-0, Army Planning and Orders 
Production, 20 January 2005, (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department 
of the Army, 2005), p. 3-1, 
https://akocomm.us.army.mil/usapa/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_aa/pdf/fm5_0.pdf 
(accessed 5/16/08). 
39 Ibid., p. 3-3. 
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Figure 7.   The Military Decision Making Process.40 
The MDMP supports a commander’s need to visualize, 
describe, and direct actions against a hostile, thinking 
enemy. Furthermore, this planning and decision making 
process requires synchronization and synergy of effects as 
current operational environments demand rapid, decisive 
operations with a multitude of assets that make up an Army 
unit’s combat power. Flexibility is also instrumental in the 
MDMP to account for Army operations across the spectrum of 
conflict.  
                     
40 Department of the Army, Field Manual 5-0, Army Planning and Orders 
Production, 20 January 2005, p. 3-3. 
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B. TASK PROCESSES 
All organizations exist to produce something.41 Army 
information tasks functional coordination cells were formed 
by FM 3-0 in a functional structure to seamlessly produce 
desired physical, informational, and cognitive effects. A 
functional structure is organized around major activity 
groups, such as each of the individual information tasks. 
Staff officers are managed together in each task to promote 
sharing of knowledge and specialization within the 
accomplishment of each task. In theory, this structure 
should promote standardization and reduce duplication.42 
However, this structure could become a barrier as the 
processes required to synchronize and de-conflict their 
activities across the coordination cells become necessary 
due to MDMP and the flexible requirements of conducting 
full-spectrum operations. 
In his book, Designing Organizations, Jay R. Galbraith 
found that in order for an organization to accomplish short- 
and long-term goals, the interdependence of functional units 
requires coordination across departments. Thus, if 
functional units are interdependent, they must coordinate to 
function. Therefore, when an endeavor like a comprehensive 
approach to the information dimension of the operating 
environment becomes multidimensional, it may not be wise to 
                     
41 The word organization for the purpose of this research can be a 
division or brigade staff. Yet, organizations are nested inside one 
another. Each of the functional coordination cells responsible for an 
Army information task represent an organization, greatly influenced by 
the surrounding staff organization. 
42 Amy Kates and Jay R. Galbraith, Designing Your Organization : 
Using the Star Model to Solve 5 Critical Design Challenges, 1st ed. (San 
Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2007), pp. 10-11. 
 41
decentralize operations into small autonomous cells because 
they risk becoming uncoordinated and perform at a less than 
optimal or “dysfunctional” level.43 This does not 
automatically mean that more complex networks are needed, 
because other dimensions of organizational theory must be 
considered before accepting that conclusion.  
Recognition of Thompson’s interdependence becomes 
paramount. Each of the five Army information tasks possesses 
an inherent reciprocal interdependence to the other tasks as 
they cumulatively shape the information dimension of the 
operational environment.44 Specifically, in the execution of 
an information campaign, the output of one staff functional 
cell responsible for one information task could become the 
input to another cell accountable for another information 
task. In this view, the Army Information Functional 
Coordination Cells represent interdependent functional 
units, as Galbraith termed “coordinated interdependent 
units.”45 The recent organizational restructuring as 
mandated in the 2008 FM 3-0 is intended to increase the 
staff proponents’ understanding of information’s 
indispensable role in any operation across the full spectrum 
of conflict. The new design further increases the number of 
staff officers that will be required to develop information 
tasks and integrate it into full spectrum operations as 
                     
43 Jay R. Galbraith, Designing Organizations : An Executive Guide to 
Strategy, Structure and Process, New and rev. ed. (San Francisco: 
Jossey-Bass, 2002), p. 5. 
44 Thompson, Organizations in Action: Social Science Bases of 
Administrative Theory, pp. 45-55, 52-53, 55-56. 
45 Galbraith, Designing Organizations : An Executive Guide to 
Strategy, Structure and Process, p. 5. 
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synergistically as it had the other elements of combat 
power, such as fires, maneuver, protection and sustainment. 
 
Figure 8.   Primary means to achieve coordination for levels 
of Task Interdependence.46 
In Army vernacular, coordination is “the action 
necessary to ensure adequately integrated relationships 
between separate organizations located in the same area.”47 
Coordination is said to take place continuously through 
operations and is essential to synchronize relevant factors 
and effectively employ all available assets. Coordination 




                     
46 Adapted from Richard L. Daft and Raymond A. Noe, Organizational 
Behavior (Mason, OH: South-Western, 2001), p. 91. 
47 Department of the Army, Field Manual 6-0, Mission Command: Command 
and Control of Army Forces, 11 August 2003, (Washington, D.C.: 



























supports MDMP by resolving problems, conflicts, and resource 
allocations. A fluid exchange of information is critical to 
successful coordination.48 
C. LATERAL TASK CONTROL 
Certainly, the autonomous construct of the information 
task cells could create boundaries that make it difficult 
for one cell to interact and synchronize information tasks 
with another. The organizational challenge then becomes “how 
to bridge these internal boundaries and integrate 
activities.”49 The term process involves the flow of 
information and decision procedures across the 
organization’s structure. Processes can be either vertical 
through planning and staff hierarchy, or horizontal through 
lateral relationships. Processes that cross organizational 
boundaries force organizational units to work together, as 
Scott A. Snook asserts, “Whatever you divide, you have to 
put back together again; the more divided, the more effort 
required to rejoin. How social systems do this is what 
organizing is all about.”50 
In addition to processes, Amy Kates and Jay R. 
Galbraith identify lateral connections that can be used to 
bridge barriers erected by an organization’s structure.51 As 
                     
48 Department of the Army, Field Manual 6-0, Mission Command: Command 
and Control of Army Forces, 11 August 2003, p. 6-15. 
49 Kates and Galbraith, Designing Your Organization : Using the Star 
Model to Solve 5 Critical Design Challenges, p. 17. 
50 Scott A. Snook, Friendly Fire : The Accidental Shootdown of U.S. 
Black Hawks Over Northern Iraq (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 2000), p. 143. 
51 Kates and Galbraith, Designing Your Organization : Using the Star 
Model to Solve 5 Critical Design Challenges, pp. 17-21. 
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FM 3-0 dictates that the autonomous functional cells will be 
the functional design, the question then becomes how can the 
interdependent information tasks be coordinated and 
synchronized across departments? Developing more lateral 
connections across departments is often more efficient than 
relying on the “up-across-down” inter-departmental flow of 
information in hierarchical communications. These lateral 
connections augment the informal relations across 
departmental boundaries that naturally develop, to create a 
more formal part of the structure.  
 
Figure 9.   Lateral integrating mechanisms.52 
One tradeoff of formal lateral connections is the 
transfer of some control from hierarchical schemes to more 
lateral, inter-departmental schemes. Some mechanisms of 
lateral connections employed to increase levels of lateral 
control are: Networks, Teams, Direct Liaison, and a full-
time Integrator. 
                     
52 Adapted from Kates and Galbraith, Designing Your Organization : 
Using the Star Model to Solve 5 Critical Design Challenges, p. 18; and, 
Jay R. Galbraith, Diane Downey and Amy Kates, Designing Dynamic 


























1. Networks  
Networks pertain to the web of interpersonal 
relationships that staff officers will form across the 
information cells and should serve to coordinate work of 
information tasks informally. Kates and Galbraith assert 
that “healthy networks are the foundation for all other 
lateral connections,” thus, this initial lateral connection 
is inclusive in the increasingly greater levels of lateral 
control that follow.53 To facilitate the required lateral 
coordination, Army units could create communities of 
practice, conduct meetings, and use technology to make 
knowledge sharing between the complimentary and 
interdependent departments possible. The planning process 
will certainly require numerous meetings to bring people 
together to collaborate information tasks and objectives. 
Given a constrained planning timeline and the flexible 
nature of full-spectrum operations, merely networking the 
functional coordination cells by the various planned MDMP 
meetings may not be sufficient enough to fully synchronize 
the nomination, synchronization, and execution of 
information tasks. 
2. Teams  
Teams are a group made up of part-time or full-time 
people from several departments set up to address a specific 
task. In formal project teams, there is usually a project 
leader assigned to coordinate group activities and 
department officers would delegate some authority to the 
                     
53 Kates and Galbraith, Designing Your Organization : Using the Star 
Model to Solve 5 Critical Design Challenges, p. 17. 
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project leader and share collective responsibility for 
outcomes.54 Teams are typically staffed by people who remain 
in their specialty role and devote part of their time to the 
team’s mission.  
The 2008 FM 3-0 Army information functional 
coordination cells are an example of full-time membership, 
yet part-time team execution of information tasks, as the 
cells’ assigned staff members are responsible for more than 
just the information dimension of the operational 
environment. Teamwork and collaboration are dependent on 
strong mechanisms for sharing information. It is assumed 
that the information task teams will be flexible enough to 
quickly adjust to changing operational circumstances. The 
individual team members will be dependent on each other to 
nominate and finish a common information task and this 
requires synchronization of individual actions, and 
cooperation between individual team members. While focusing 
on the collaboration within the team, little time may be 
allotted to synchronize the work with adjacent information 
teams, potentially requiring the next higher degree of 
lateral connections, the liaison. 
3. Direct Liaison 
Galbraith developed various types of liaison devices on 
the basis of the degree of lateral inclusion in decision-
making. Lateral inclusion is defined in terms of the 
explicitness of the horizontal decision role and authority 
                     
54  Kates and Galbraith, Designing Your Organization: Using the Star 
Model to Solve 5 Critical Design Challenges, p. 18. 
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in decision making.55 Staffs coordinate plans, execution, 
and adjustment decisions internally to keep operations 
synchronized.56 An Army liaison role could bridge 
departments and have responsibility for troubleshooting, 
integrating, and conflict resolution. In addition to passing 
information, the liaison can add meaning and context to 
information they send and receive.57 The G/S-3 could assign 
a liaison officer to bridge the information functional cells 
in order to synchronize information tasks, or the G/S-7 
could serve this function while simultaneously serving as a 
member of the Information Engagement functional cell.  
4. Integrator 
An integrator provides a higher level of coordination 
than teams and direct liaison. An integrative role can 
consist of a full-time manager charged with synchronizing 
work across departments. The integrator can have 
accountability for results but does not directly manage the 
resources required to achieve those results. The integrator 
achieves power through a direct, reporting relationship to 
the commander. The 2001 FM 3-0 and 2003 FM 3-13 supported 
the legacy paradigm in which G/S-7s were responsible for 
coordinating all IO capabilities. In this respect, G/S-7s 
were referred to as integrators of IO capabilities and the 
accountable staff principal who synchronized information 
activities derived from his training, knowledge, and 
expertise of the full range of IO capabilities and related 
                     
55 Galbraith, Designing Complex Organizations, p. 150. 
56 Department of the Army, Field Manual 6-0, Mission Command: Command 
and Control of Army Forces, 11 August 2003, p. 6-26. 
57 Ibid., p. 3-23. 
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activities. The G/S-3 could assign an operations officer to 
serve as the full-time information task integrator or the 
G/S-7 could perform the integrator role while concurrently 
serving as a member of the Information Engagement functional 
cell. 
Although Galbraith’s findings on organizational 
functionality derived from his examination of private sector 
companies, such as Hewlett-Packard and Boeing, and not Army 
staffs at the operational and tactical levels of war, this 
makes little difference from a command and control 
perspective. Executed independently, the interdependent 
nature of the tasks of the Army information functional cells 
requires some form of lateral coordination across those 
cells.  
 
Figure 10.   Unaligned organizational structure and 
processes.58 
                     
58 Adapted from Galbraith, Downey and Kates, Designing Dynamic 
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In absence of this process of unimpeded and fluid flow 
of information and decision procedures across the 
organization’s structure, the staff could likely become 
uncoordinated and perform at a less-than-optimal level, 
leading to gridlock and friction. Conversely, a framework of 
facilitation and coordination can promote innovation and 
stimulate creativity.59 
D. INFORMATION TASK FRICTION POINTS 
Placement of operational and tactical Army 
organizations into the context of the combined open systems 
model is extensive because of the complex and dynamic 
internal and external and variables that affect information 
task planning and management at those levels of warfare. In 
order to analyze the work to be accomplished by the staff, 
and the accomplishment of information tasks by the 
individual functional coordination cells, the Galbraith 
theory of degree of lateral processes now serves as a 
structure to identify six Information Tasks Friction Points. 
These friction points will then serve as evaluative criteria 
between the staff organizational structures as delineated in 
the 2008 FM 3-0. This organizational design, as well as a 
hybrid model, will be evaluated for their effectiveness to 
accomplish information tasks.  
Full spectrum operations demand a flexible approach to 
planning.60 During the MDMP, critical informational 
dimension requirements present themselves that require 
                     
59 Kates and Galbraith, Designing Your Organization : Using the Star 
Model to Solve 5 Critical Design Challenges, p. 169. 
60 Department of the Army, Field Manual 5-0, Army Planning and Orders 
Production, 20 January 2005, p. 1-2. 
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identifying, analyzing, and understanding of those publics 
and actors whose perceptions, attitudes, beliefs, and 
behaviors will affect the unit’s mission. 
 
Table 1.   Information Tasks Friction Points during the 
MDMP.61 
The input of Step 1. of the MDMP, Receipt of Mission, 
is receipt of the higher headquarters or Joint headquarters 
Operations Plan (OPLAN), Operations Order (OPORD), or 
Warning Order (WARNO). This step leads us to the first 
information task friction point:    
1. Commander’s Orientation to Information Dimension  
The commander’s conceptualization of the information 
dimension at the start of the operations process is critical 
to his understanding of the operational environment. Because 
                     
61 Information Tasks Friction Points encountered during the MDMP. 
(Military Operations)5. Flexibility during current operations
6. Coordination with Higher 
Headquarters and Joint community
Step 7: Orders Production4. Staff roles, training, and bounded 
rationality
Step 6: COA Approval
Step 5: COA Comparison
Step 4: COA Analysis (War Game)
Step 3: COA Development
3. Synchronization of information tasks 
throughout operations process
Step 2: Mission Analysis2. Analysis of information tasks inherent 
in shaping and decisive operations to 
meet Commander’s Intent
Step 1: Receipt of Mission1. Commander’s conceptualization of the 
Information Dimension of the 
Operational Environment at start of 
the operations process (MDMP)
Steps of the Military Decision Making 
Process
Information Tasks Friction Points
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military operations are fundamentally dynamic, this 
visualization not only forms the basis of commanders’ 
initial situational understanding, it continually must be 
validated throughout the operations process.62 
Upon receipt of the mission, the commander and staff 
perform an initial assessment. Based on this assessment, the 
commander issues the initial guidance to begin the planning 
process.63 Commanders describe their visualization in the 
form of their intent. During planning, the commander’s 
intent drives the MDMP. The staff uses it to develop courses 
of action that conform to how the commander wants to achieve 
the end state.64 
The commander is required to consider all operational 
aspects of the environment, to include the information 
dimension, in a singular plan from its inception. The 
commander and organizational staff must conceptualize those 
cognitive effects likely to produce the desired end state, 
and then design an operation with physical actions, words, 
and images synchronized in such a way as to best promote the 
desired outcomes. In other words, commanders must “match 
information tasks with actions on the ground in their 
concept of operation.”65 
                     
62 Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-0, Operations, 27 February 
2008, p. 5-4. 
63 Department of the Army, Field Manual 5-0, Army Planning and Orders 
Production, 20 January 2005, pp. 3-12 - 3-15. 
64 Department of the Army, Field Manual 6-0, Mission Command: Command 
and Control of Army Forces, 11 August 2003, p. 4-8. 
65 Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-0, Operations, 27 February 
2008, p. 7-2. 
 52
The staff is instrumental in enabling the commander’s 
clear understanding of friendly force’s current state in 
relation to the adversary and the environment. Accurate 
situational understanding of the information dimension is 
critical to focus the information element of combat power to 
accomplish the mission. 
2. Analysis of Necessary Information Tasks 
The commander builds on his visualiztion by analyzing 
the information tasks inherent in shaping and decisive 
operations to meet his intent. Step 2 of the MDMP, Mission 
Analysis, consists of 17 tasks to “help commanders refine 
their situational understanding and determine their 
mission.”66 One of the most critical tasks of Mission 
Analysis is the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield 
(IPB) in which intelligence requirements are generated that 
are essential to staff estimates, targeting, and the rest of 
the decision making process. A significant step of the IPB 
is to describe the battlefield’s effects. This step involves 
evaluating all aspects of the environment, to include an 
analysis of information tasks inherent in shaping and 
decisive operations planning to meet the commander’s intent. 
Identifying all of the opportunities the operating 
environment presents, such as the ability of actors in the 
information dimension to effect friendly decision making and 
operations, is critical at this point in the MDMP in order 
to generate implied information tasks that were not 
explicitly stated in the higher headquarters’ order. Early  
 
                     
66 Department of the Army, Field Manual 5-0, Army Planning and Orders 
Production, 20 January 2005, p. 3-15. 
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dissemination of IO-related information tasks and 
requirements facilitates synchronization and collaborative 
planning. 
3. Synchronization of Information Tasks 
The synchronization of information tasks throughout 
operations process is critical in mobilizing resources, 
collaboration, and the synergistic application of 
information capabilities to achieve the desired effects. In 
developing courses of action, staff members determine the 
doctrinal requirements for each type of mission.67 Some 
information tasks, such as those that use fire support, 
intelligence, or maneuver assets, require tradeoffs with 
other maneuver options.68 The staff considers these trade-
offs through a collaborative process to generate options 
during course of action analysis. 
When developing information tasks, the staff considers 
all IO elements and determines, based on available assets 
and resources, what contributions each can achieve to 
decisively achieve an operational objective. Tasks of 
several IO elements and related activities may contribute to 
accomplishing a single operational objective, or a single 
information task may support more than one operational 
objective.69 This interdependence of the information  
 
                     
67 Department of the Army, Field Manual 5-0, Army Planning and Orders 
Production, 20 January 2005, p. 3-33. 
68 Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-13, Information Operations: 
Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, 28 November 2003, p. 5-
22. 
69 Ibid., p. 5-24. 
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functional cells may require a mechanism of lateral 
coordination to effectively synchronize their desired 
effects. 
4. Staff Roles, Training, and Bounded Rationality 
In his book Administrative Behavior, the prominent 
economist Herbert A. Simon noted “it is impossible for the 
behavior of a single, isolated individual to reach any high 
degree of rationality.”70 Simon’s idea is predicated on the 
value information has on mental processes and how mental 
processes are enhanced through interpersonal exchanges.  
Though Simon’s work did not focus on the lateral 
coordination of functional units, his theory is relevant 
across all the information task friction points. The 
importance of discussing this theory emphasizes the 
potential interoperability friction points between 
functional cells independently administering information 
tasks. 
Daily brief requirements and a communication barrage of 
phones and emails can easily overwhelm staff officers and 
focus everyone inward instead of outward. Operational and 
tactical level staffs need to use well-reasoned analysis, 
intellect, and experience to capture a commander’s intent 
and guidance and transform them into coordinated, 
synchronized, resourced, and executable plans and orders. 
Given the increasingly complex and fluid operational 
environments, the Army staffs may seek shortcuts to produce 
                     
70 Herbert Alexander Simon, Administrative Behavior : A Study of 
Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organization, 3d ed. (New 
York: Free Press, 1976), pp. 79-81. 
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concept of operation plans rapidly, while simultaneously 
engaged in current operations. If enhanced lateral 
coordination between the information functional cells 
promotes information sharing and information sharing 
improves the synchronized application of information tasks, 
then the concept of lateral connectedness is not only 
“rational” in the Simonian sense, but a wise organizational 
decision. 
This issue of bounded rationality leads to a number of 
questions regarding staff roles and training: Can the 
functional cells’ individual staff members fluidly 
accomplish the new information tasks assigned to them in the 
2008 FM 3-0? Do they understand the IO capabilities enough 
to create and oversee the execution of those information 
tasks? Potentially, each staff section and functional cell 
could view the operational environment from the perspective 
of their own information capabilities. Under the 2003 FM 3-0 
organizational construct, no one staff section would 
visualize the complete information environment to determine 
how the information capabilities could collectively affect 
the means by which the adversary and civilian populations 
understand and use information. The lack of an information 
task focal point on staff could compound stove-piped 
planning as staff sections focus solely on their information 
capabilities and their segment of the operational 
environment. 
5. Flexibility during Current Operations 
While the above four friction points focused on 
planning, this friction point focuses on flexibility and 
other aspects of current operations. A staff must determine 
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whether an adversary commander and other targeted leaders 
are reacting to IO as was anticipated during planning. New 
adversary vulnerabilities and new information-related 
targets may present themselves during active military 
operations. Given the predominance of information systems in 
this century, “the time available to exploit new adversary 
command and control vulnerabilities may be limited and 
requires an immediate response” from several interdependent 
information elements and capabilities.71 Flexibility is 
crucial to success in information task execution and staffs 
must be flexible enough to compensate for adversary 
information activities, while exploiting projected and 
unanticipated adversary vulnerabilities. As an operation 
unfolds and the operational environment becomes increasingly 
fluid, information objectives and tasks must be seamlessly 
modified to exploit success and protect friendly 
vulnerabilities, or risk becoming ineffectual or harmful to 
the mission. 
6. Coordination with Higher Headquarters 
IO planned and conducted by functional components must 
be conducted within the parameters established by higher 
Army headquarters or the Joint Forces Command. Subordinate 
services plan and execute information tasks as an integrated 
element of higher or Joint headquarters. The 2008 FM 3-0 is 
ahead of Joint doctrine which still recognizes IO as the 
“integrated employment” of core, supporting, and related 
information capabilities “to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or 
                     
71 Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-13, Information Operations: 
Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, 28 November 2003,      p. 
7-5. 
 57
usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while 
protecting our own.”72  By this definition, Joint doctrine 
states that IO is still the aggregate of those friendly 
elements that operate to influence the information 
dimension. The J-39 IO Cell Chief could be the higher 
headquarters for Army units operating under a Joint Command. 
This arrangement will require an Army staff information 
integrator that possesses a full understanding and lateral 
synchronization of information operations at their level, to 
harmonize with the Joint Planning Group. The sub-division of 
Army information tasks assigned to numerous staff cells 
could present synchronization challenges as Army units down 
to the tactical level of command may regularly interact with 
a Joint headquarters and require lateral coordination with 
other adjacent Services. 
E. 2008 FM 3-0 LATERAL COORDINATION EVALUATION 
The new 2008 FM 3-0 has dictated that the former 
concept of information operations now be divided into five 
Army information tasks in regard to the work required to 
operate within the information dimension of the operational 
environment. The responsibility for executing these 
information tasks has been distributed to independent staff 
functional cells, to arguably be synchronized through the 
operations process. 
                     
72 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-13, Information 
Operations, 13 February 2006, p. ix. 
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Figure 11.   2008 FM 3-0 Organizational Design.73 
The 2008 FM 3-0 assumes that staffs will be capable of 
a more complex staff process and this assumption could prove 
risky. The Operations doctrine asserts that all operations 
should be conceived in terms of affecting human will. To 
synchronize the primarily cognitive information tasks, FM  
3-0 suggests that the operations process, or MDMP, will be 
sufficient to guide the staff through the planning process 
and synergistic execution of the plan. Equally important, 
the individual information task functional cells may not be  
                     
73 The organizational design of the 2008 FM 3-0, Operations, is 
depicted with the five delineated Information Tasks Functional 
Coordination Cells dealing with the six Information Tasks Friction 
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prepared to match higher headquarters’ specified tasks with 
the implied informational tasks required to gain and 
maintain information superiority. 
The Galbraith theory of lateral processes served as a 
structure to analyze the work to be accomplished against 
during planning and military operations. The six Information 
Tasks Friction Points exposed inherent weaknesses in the 
2008 FM 3-0 organizational design’s effectiveness to 
synchronize and accomplish informational short- and long-
term goals. Without a lateral coordination process across 
the interdependent information functional cells, 
organizational effectiveness could be negatively affected 
and manifested through: 
1. Stove-piping 
Organizational theorists frequently caution against 
creating decentralized organizational ‘silos’ that lack a 
lateral coordination process, particularly in complex 
environments.74 The self-governing information task cells 
could likely create boundaries that make it difficult for 
one functional cell to interact and synchronize information 
tasks with another. Each functional cell responsible for 
their information task risks planning the employment of 
their capabilities individually without knowledge of what 
other staff sections are planning for their information 
capabilities. Until the staff members laterally coordinate 
efforts across the doctrinal coordinating cells, there is 
likely to be little synergy between the information 
                     
74 Kates and Galbraith, Designing Your Organization : Using the Star 
Model to Solve 5 Critical Design Challenges, pp. 16-17. 
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capabilities. Stove-piped planning without a lateral 
coordination mechanism could potentially result in a form of 
information fratricide, the result of employing information 
tasks in a way that causes effects in the information 
dimension that impede friendly military operations or 
adversely affect friendly forces.75 A familiar example is 
friendly force electronic jamming inadvertently degrading 
planned PSYOP radio broadcasts.76 Relying on an inefficient 
“up-across-down” flow of information in the functional cell 
hierarchical structure to mitigate these impediments may 
likely result in a loss of valuable planning time due to the 
unanticipated, yet required, informal synchronization and 
de-confliction. 
2. De-synchronization 
As a result of the functional cell hierarchical 
structure, and in the absence of mechanisms to foster 
coordination, the organizational structure could feasibly 
become a barrier to sub-unit synchronization. It is assumed 
that various informal coordination mechanisms will be used 
to overcome these barriers to promote increased sub-unit 
coordination and to achieve improved organizational 
outcomes. To accomplish this informal synchronization goal, 
however, each staff section responsible for information 
tasks would be required to attend numerous functional cell 
meetings at which their information capability may be 
discussed. Numerous coordination requirements or conflicts 
between capabilities could emerge at each of these 
                     
75 Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-13, Information Operations: 
Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, 28 November 2003, p. 1-5. 
76 Ibid., p. 1-5. 
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coordinating cells meetings. Each new requirement or 
conflict would then have to be referred back to the parent 
staff section to be re-planned and re-synchronized with that 
staff’s other information capabilities, and then sent back 
to the coordinating cells to ensure integrated employment.  
The likely result would be a loss of time, redundant 
efforts, and reduced organizational effectiveness. 
3. Over-reliance on an Individual 
Given Simon’s notion that no single individual can 
achieve a high degree of rationality, the expectations of 
the CoS and G/S-3 could prove to be unrealistic. Countless 
studies suggest that people differ in skills, values and 
beliefs. These differences often relate to ways of effective 
decision making in a given situation.77 
Under the 2008 FM 3-0 information task construct, the 
Chief of Staff (CoS) and the G/S-3 must conduct their normal 
operational planning and execution duties, understand all 
the information capabilities and differentiate how they 
could affect the information dimension, and further find the 
time to synchronize them. The matter of over-reliance on the 
individual in the 2008 FM 3-0 organizational design may have 
less to do with the operational competency of the CoS and 
the G/S-3, and have more to do with information overload and 
bounded rationality. The problems inherent in information 
exceeding the individual’s ability to process it, creates 
difficulty in determining which information is relevant.78 
                     
77 Steven Kerr, Organizational Behavior (Columbus, Ohio: Grid 
Publishing, 1979), p. 74. 
78 Ibid., pp. 143-144. 
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As Mintzberg has shown, successful management is impeded by 
time pressures and competition between wide varieties of 
tasks.79 Without a lateral information task coordinator, the 
CoS or the G/S-3 task manager will be required to nominate, 
synchronize, and de-conflict information capabilities while 
simultaneously performing their extensive doctrinal 
operational duties. 
4. Incompatibility 
Information tasks planned and conducted by subordinate 
units assigned to a Joint headquarters must be conducted 
within the parameters established by the Joint Forces 
Commander. Joint headquarters plan and synchronize 
information operations through the J-39 IO Cell Chief. A 
primary function of the J-39 is to ensure that IO are 
‘integrated and synchronized in all planning processes’ and 
that IO are coordinated with subordinate staffs.80 
Components are responsible for the detailed planning and 
execution of IO, yet the Army component must conduct these 
information activities within the parameters established by 
the Joint Force Commander. With no corresponding information 
coordinator at the Army headquarters, this could create 
friction between the Joint task force and the Army service 
component. 
To integrate and synchronize the core, supporting, and 
related capabilities of IO, the J-39 normally leads an IO 
Cell as an integrated component of the staff’s operational 
                     
79 Henry Mintzberg, The Structuring of Organizations: A Synthesis of 
the Research (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1979), pp. 24-29. 
80 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-13, Information 
Operations, 13 February 2006, p. xiii. 
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planning group.81 The organizational relationship between 
the joint IO Cell and the Army service component could 
become strained, as multiple subordinate Army staff sections 
would have to coordinate directly with the J-39. More 
seriously yet, Army corps or divisions serving as a Joint 
Task Force will either have to create a J-39 or have each of 
their staff sections responsible for an individual Army 
information task coordinate directly with the information 
operations staffs at Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps 
subordinate headquarters. While this information task 
friction point seems to be centered on echelons above the 
scope of this research, only the complexity and length of 
planning horizons differ at the operational and tactical 
levels, and IO execution complexity stems from the multiple 
information elements and the coordination required between 
echelons. 
F. CONCLUSION 
This chapter built upon previously introduced 
guidelines of how the U.S. Army accomplishes information 
tasks at the operational and tactical levels of warfare and 
planning. By identifying information friction points, the 
evaluation of the 2008 FM 3-0 organizational design 
indicated that the functional structure of the Army 
interdependent information task cells could become a barrier 
as it becomes necessary to synchronize and de-conflict their 
activities across other cells. Assuming this hypothesis is 
true, the 2008 FM 3-0 organizational design of five 
                     
81 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-13, Information 
Operations, 13 February 2006, p. xiii. 
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independent functional cells could create negative friction 
points that reduces optimal functionality.  
By all indications, the proposition of a lateral 
coordination mechanism does not violate the general 
organizational guidance found in FM 3-0. Just as commanders 
are given the latitude to “match information tasks with 
actions on the ground,”82 they are also allowed the 
flexibility to organize their staffs when dealing with 
specific tactical and operational situations. The aim of the 
2008 FM 3-0 is to establish guidelines for leaders to direct 
operations while allowing enough freedom for bold, creative 
initiative in any situation. While the codification of a 
formal lateral coordination mechanism synchronizing the 
information task coordination cells may not invoke creative 
initiative, it does establish a logical framework to 
mitigate information task friction points inherent in 










                     
82 Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-0, Operations, 27 February 
2008, p. 7-2. 
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS  
This chapter contains observations from the lateral 
processes analysis and provides recommendations for the Army 
operational and tactical organizations executing information 
tasks. Given the determination in the previous chapter of 
how the various information functional cells will be 
required to interact to achieve the output goal, it is now 
necessary to illustrate how a formal lateral coordination 
device between the cells could mitigate the negative effects 
of the information friction points. 
Organizational contingency theory is founded on two 
chief principles.83 The first principle is that there is no 
one best way to organize. The suitability of an 
organization’s structural arrangement relies on a number of 
factors. These factors can, for example, be the level of 
complexity and uncertainty in the operational environment. 
The second principle is that all ways of organizing are not 
equally effective. Specifically, organizations that 
demonstrate structures that fit the requirements of their 
environment will be more effective than organizations which 
do not.84 
An informed judgment can now be made regarding the 
benefit of lateral coordination between the information 
functional cells. First, it was determined that the 2008 FM 
3-0 organizational design of five independent functional 
                     
83 Galbraith, Designing Complex Organizations, p. 2. 
84 Richard M. Burton and Børge Obel, Strategic Organizational 
Diagnosis and Design: Developing Theory for Application, 2nd ed. 
(Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998), pp. 15-18. 
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cells could create negative friction points that reduces 
optimal functionality. Assuming that this analysis is true, 
the second issue to be resolved is whether a formal lateral 
coordination device between the cells could mitigate the 
negative friction points, thus, aiding in synergistically 
accomplishing information tasks in a complex operating 
environment. 
A. 2001 FM 3-0 AND 2008 FM 3-0 HYBRID ORGANIZATIONAL 
DESIGN 
My hypothesis is that a hybrid of the 2008 FM 3-0 
organizational design and its 2001 predecessor’s design will 
best synchronize the accomplishment of the interdependent 
information tasks, producing a structural arrangement that 
will be most effective in incorporating information tasks 
into the complex operational environment. The suggested 
hybrid cannot, however, violate the 2008 FM 3-0 as it is 
approved doctrine. The 2001 FM 3-0, Operations, and the 2003 
FM 3-13, Information Operations, mandated that it was the 
role of the G/S-7 to assist the commander’s understanding of 
the information dimension of the operating environment at 
the beginning, and throughout the MDMP. As a trained staff 
officer in the employment of the core, supporting and 
related information capabilities, the G/S-7 was the 
accountable staff principle who synchronized information 
activities derived from knowledge and expertise of the full 
range of IO capabilities and related activities. 
B. HYBRID DESIGN LATERAL COORDINATION 
The dictated alignment of information tasks to the 
responsible staff element is based on sound reasoning. 
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Affecting the Information Dimension requires a combined 
staff effort in a combined arms approach. There is but one 
operational environment, and physical maneuver operations, 
words, and images directed at any aspect of the operational 
environment affects the information dimension.85 While this 
research does not question the reasoning for aligning 
information task responsibility with the staff proponents 
possessing the deepest knowledge of the capabilities and 
intended effects, it does assert that the organizational 
effectiveness in accomplishment of Army Information Tasks 
can be improved by establishing a lateral coordination 
mechanism to increase lateral control.   
By establishing a lateral coordination liaison or full-
time integrator, the recognized Information Task Friction 
Points can be mitigated along the MDMP and throughout the 
conduct of operations. During the MDMP, critical 
informational dimension requirements present themselves that 
require identifying, analyzing, and understanding of those 
publics and actors whose perceptions, attitudes, beliefs, 
and behaviors will affect the unit’s mission.  
 
                     
85 Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-0, Operations, 27 February 
2008, p. 1-1. 
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Table 2.   Lateral Coordinator affect on Information Tasks 
Friction Points.86 
The lateral processes analysis concluded that there is 
a need for an Army information task coordinator to manage 
the coordination of the information tasks into operational 
planning and execution. In addition, the analysis showed how 
the staff alignment of the Army information tasks could be 
enhanced and friction points mitigated by a lateral 
coordination mechanism with the responsibility for 
synchronizing the Army staff’s information tasks through: 
1. Direct Liaison 
The first method to achieve lateral coordination among 
the interdependent Army information functional cells is to 
create a duty position within the G/S-3 for a trained, 
                     
86 Information Tasks Friction Points mitigated by a formal lateral 
coordination role. 
Coordinator estimates the effectiveness 
of IO task execution, adjusting to a 
changing friendly situation or adversary 
reaction
5. Flexibility during current operations
Coordinator synchronizes IO 
objectives/tasks with counterparts at 
higher and Joint echelons
6. Coordination with Higher 
Headquarters and Joint community
Coordinator identifies IO targets and 
nominates them through the Targeting 
process
4. Staff roles, training, and bounded 
rationality
Coordinator’s primary function is to 
synchronize IO throughout the operations 
process
3. Synchronization of information tasks 
throughout operations process
Coordinator has coordinating staff 
responsibility for IO with support in the IO 
and Fires Cells
2. Analysis of information tasks inherent 
in shaping and decisive operations to 
meet Commander’s Intent
Coordinator assists the commander’s 
understanding of the Information 
Dimension through the Staff 
Estimate process 
1. Commander’s conceptualization of the 
Information Dimension of the 
Operational Environment at start of 
the operations process (MDMP)
Lateral coordination Liaison or full-
time Integrator mitigation
Information Tasks Friction Points
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certified, and qualified information task coordinator to 
liaise across all of the functional information cells. The 
G/S-3 could assign this liaison officer from his section to 
bridge the functional cells in order to synchronize 
information tasks, or the G/S-7 could serve this function on 
behalf of the G/S-3 while simultaneously serving as a member 
of the Information Engagement functional cell. 
The information task liaison would be responsible for 
coordination and synchronization of the information tasks 
functional coordination cells to insure information 
capabilities are correctly applied and no unintentional 
information effects occur. The role of the liaison is not 
intended as a reversion back to the concept of the G/S-7 as 
codified in the 2001 FM 3-0 and 2003 FM 3-13. Coordination 
was the role originally intended of the Information 
Operations Officer, yet organizational uncertainty led to 
the misperception that the G/S-7 was responsible for 
executing the numerous core and supporting elements of IO. 
With an information tasks liaison mechanism in place, the 
information task functional cells would still remain 
responsible for accomplishment of the information tasks, 
while the liaison is given the responsibility for 
synchronization, troubleshooting, and conflict resolution.  
2. Full-time Integrator 
Another method to achieve an even greater lateral 
control between the information functional cells is to 
establish a fully trained, certified and qualified 
information capabilities integrator duty position to 
administer the work of the five information functional 
cells. The role of the staff information capabilities 
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integrator would be to match the core, supporting, and 
related information operations capabilities with each 
functional cell’s information requirements, then coordinate 
and synchronize the information tasks across those cells. 
This lateral control mechanism again requires the 
creation of a duty position within the G/S-3 of a trained, 
certified and qualified information task coordinator to 
integrate the functional cells, or involves empowering the 
G/S-7 to achieve this integration function while 
participating as a member of the Information Engagement 
functional cell. An integration role provides a higher level 
of coordination than the direct liaison and the information 
task integrator would have accountability for information 
task accomplishment, but not directly manage the resources 
required to achieve those results. 
The integrator achieves this power through a direct 
reporting relationship to the commander. The 2001 FM 3-0 and 
2003 FM 3-13 stipulated that the G/S-7s were responsible for 
coordinating all IO capabilities. In this respect, G/S-7s 
were considered integrators of IO capabilities and the 
accountable staff principal who synchronized information 
activities derived from his training, knowledge, and 
expertise of IO capabilities and related activities. The 
difference between the 2001 FM 3-0 paradigm and the 
information tasks integrator concept includes a higher 
degree of lateral control in the latter. The assigned G/S-3 
integrator or the G/S-7 would directly administer the work 
of the five information functional cells, and assume 
responsibility for accomplishment of the information tasks. 
In order to mitigate the information friction points 
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encountered during the MDMP and the execution of operations, 
the integrator would increase the effectiveness of the 
staff’s information task accomplishment by: 
• Assisting the commander’s understanding of the 
Information Dimension through the Staff Estimate 
process.  
• Coordinating staff responsibility for IO with 
support in the IO and Fires Cells. 
• Synchronizing IO throughout the operations 
process. 
• Identifying IO targets and nominates them through 
the targeting process. 
• Estimating the effectiveness of IO task execution, 
adjusting to a changing friendly situation or 
adversary reaction. 
• Synchronizing IO objectives and necessary 
information tasks with counterparts at higher and 
Joint echelons. 
The interdependent nature of the tasks of the Army 
information functional cells requires either a liaison or an 
integrator form of lateral coordination across those cells. 
The 2008 FM 3-0 organizational restructuring was intended to 
increase the staffs’ understanding of the information 
dimension’s impact on the operational environment. The 
proposed addition of an information task coordinator further 
enhances the effectiveness of the staff as it develops 
information tasks and integrates them into full spectrum 
operations as synergistically as it had the other elements 




The first phase of this study identified the five Army 
information tasks, with the responsibility redistributed to 
different staff functional cells, ultimately to be 
synchronized by the operations process. Descriptions of each 
coordination cell and each of their information capabilities 
were explained and information friction points were 
identified to illustrate symptoms of desynchronized 
information operations that negatively affect military 
operations. 
The second phase of this study demonstrated how the 
2008 FM 3-0 organizational design lacked a sufficient degree 
of effectiveness to laterally coordinate the reciprocally 
interdependent information tasks. Observations from the 
lateral processes analysis led to subsequent recommendations 
for more effectively organizing Army operational and 
tactical units executing information tasks.  
This study contends that a hybrid of the 2008 FM 3-0 
organizational design and its 2001 predecessor’s design will 
best synchronize the accomplishment of the interdependent 
information tasks, producing a structural arrangement that 
will be most effective in incorporating information tasks 
into the complex operational environment. There is a need 
for a formal information tasks coordinator to oversee the 
synchronization of the information tasks into operational 
planning and execution, and this function can be achieved by 
appointing a G/S-3 or G/S-7 liaison officer or full-
integrator to accomplish the required degree of lateral 
coordination. In short, the combined performance and 
effectiveness of the operational and tactical Army staff 
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organization requires this lateral process of coordination 
to synchronize the highly-interdependent information tasks. 
Information is elemental to combat power, but to 
properly and effectively employ this capability requires 
coordination, synchronization, and integration with the 
other warfighting elements. As FM 3-0 asserts, “commanders 
must understand [information], integrating it in full 
spectrum operations as carefully as fires, maneuver, 
protection, and sustainment.”87 To comply with this mandate, 
commanders require a lateral coordinator whose dual-role or 
sole mission focus is to synchronize the Army information 









                     
87 Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-0, Operations, 27 February 
2008, p. 7-1. 
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APPENDIX – ARMY INFORMATION TASKS FUNCTIONAL 
COORDINATION CELLS STAFFING  
This Appendix will discuss the execution of the five IO 
tasks by the individual proponents and capabilities in each 
of the responsible functional coordination cells as codified 
in the 2008 FM 3-0. 
A. INFORMATION ENGAGEMENT FUNCTIONAL COORDINATION CELL 
The primary staff responsibility for the conduct of the 
Information Engagement functional cell is the G/S-7 
Information Operations Officer with Public Affairs, PSYOP 
and G/S-9 Civil Affairs support within the information 
engagement cell. The staff proponents and capabilities of 
the Information Engagement Cell include: 
1. Leader and Soldier Engagement 
Soldiers’ actions are the most powerful component of 
information engagement. Visible actions coordinated with 
carefully chosen, truthful words influence audiences more 
than either does alone. Face-to-face interaction by leaders 
and soldiers strongly influences the perceptions of the 
local populace. Carried out with discipline and 
professionalism, day-to-day interaction of Soldiers with the 
local populace among whom they operate can have positive 
effects. 
As the primary staff responsibility for the conduct of 
the Information Engagement functional cell, G/S-7s serve as 
the Commander’s focal point for achieving the full potential 
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of information, engagement, communication, and collaboration 
in an era of persistent conflict. Specifically, they may: 
• Coordinate the information engagement activities 
and ensure the proper integration of those 
activities into base plans and orders. 
• Assist in identifying, analyzing, and 
understanding those publics and actors whose 
perceptions, attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors 
affect the unit’s mission. 
• Assist in determining the desired end state 
conditions for each relevant public and actor in 
terms of perceptions, attitudes, beliefs, and 
behavior. 
• Assist with the campaign design, ensuring planned 
deeds, words, and images are mutually reinforcing 
and likely to produce the intended change in 
behavior. 
• Assist in developing a campaign or mission 
narrative.88 
2. Public Affairs 
Public Affairs (PA) is defined as ‘Those public 
information, command information, and community relations 
activities directed toward both the external and internal 
publics with interest in the Department of Defense.’89 
Public Affairs forms an important part in the dissemination 
of truthful information to both internal and external 
audiences so that a correct perspective of combat operations 
is projected. A more coordinated and deliberate approach is 
required to match the actions on the ground with what is 
                     
88 U.S. Army Information Operations Proponent, U.S. Army Combined 
Arms Center, Fact Sheet: Functional Area 30 Qualification Course (FA30 
QC), 15 October 2008. 
89 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of 
Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001, as Amended through 30 May 
2008, p. 442. 
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projected through PA outlets. It is also used to counter 
adversaries’ misinformation and disinformation campaigns 
through dissemination of accurate information.  
3. Psychological Operations 
PSYOP are defined as ‘Planned operations to convey 
selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to 
influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and 
ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, 
organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of PSYOP 
is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior 
favorable to the originator’s objective.’90 The PSYOP 
objectives are met through the use of radio, print, and 
other electronic media. The cross-cultural and regional 
understanding for conducting successful PSYOP against target 
audiences is an essential element. 
4. Combat Camera 
Combat Camera (COMCAM) is defined as ‘The acquisition 
and utilization of still and motion imagery in support of 
combat, information, humanitarian, intelligence, 
reconnaissance, engineering, legal, public affairs, and 
other operations involving the Military Services.’91 COMCAM 
is effectively used for the battle of ideas and provides the 
imagery requirement for PSYOP, MILDEC, PA and CMO. COMCAM 
products can also be disseminated to regional media 
organizations to achieve wider publicity and for use in 
                     
90 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of 
Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001, as Amended through 30 May 
2008, p. 441. 
91 Ibid., p. 97. 
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subtle influence operations toward a wider public audience. 
The dissemination of such products may also be conducted 
through the Internet so as to exploit the reach of the 
Internet in news or imagery propagation. 
5. Strategic Communication and Defense Support to 
Public Diplomacy 
Strategic Communication is defined as ‘Focused United 
States Government efforts to understand and engage key 
audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions 
favorable for the advancement of United States Government 
interests, policies, and objectives through the use of 
coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products 
synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national 
power.’92 
Defense Support to Public Diplomacy (DSPD) is defined 
by the U.S. military as ‘Those activities and measures taken 
by the Department of Defense components to support and 
facilitate public diplomacy efforts of the United States 
Government.’93 This activity is conducted at the strategic 
and operational level and attempts to mesh the foreign 
policy objectives with much broader goals including specific 
military information operations objectives. The operations 
conducted by the Army at the tactical level also fall into 
this category since they can either support the overall 
public diplomacy effort or cause an adverse impact. The 
vulnerability of military field operations to cause an 
                     
92 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of 
Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001, as Amended through 30 May 
2008, p. 522. 
93 Ibid., p. 150. 
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adverse impact on the information dimension of the 
operational environment needs to be adequately factored and 
duly understood by military commanders at all levels. 
B. COMMAND AND CONTROL WARFARE FUNCTIONAL COORDINATION 
CELL 
The primary staff responsibility for the conduct of the 
Command and Control Warfare functional cell is the G/S-3 
Operations Officer with G/S-2 Intelligence Officer support 
within the fires cell. The staff proponents and capabilities 
of the Command and Control Warfare Cell include: 
1. Physical Attack 
Physical attack disrupts, damages, or destroys 
adversary targets through the use of destructive power, and 
is fundamental to all military operations. It may lead to 
create or alter adversary perceptions or to facilitate an 
adversary to use certain exploitable information systems. In 
terms of a supporting element of information operations, it 
needs to be integrated with PSYOP to achieve the required 
influence over a target audience and coordinated to destroy 
specific command and control nodes of the adversary. This 
facet allows synchronization between the physical objectives 
and the informational objectives in a battlefield.  
2. Electronic Warfare (minus Electronic Protection) 
Electronic Warfare (EW) is defined as ‘Military action 
involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to 
control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the 
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enemy.’94 EW includes three major sub-divisions: electronic 
protection (EP), which is a component of the Information 
Protection Functional Coordination Cell, electronic attack 
(EA), ‘Involving the use of electromagnetic energy, directed 
energy, or antiradiation weapons to attack personnel, 
facilities, or equipment with the intent of degrading, 
neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat capability and is 
considered a form of fires,’95 and electronic warfare 
support (ES), ‘Involving actions tasked by, or under direct 
control of, an operational commander to search for, 
intercept, identify, and locate or localize sources of 
intentional and unintentional radiated electromagnetic 
energy for the purpose of immediate threat recognition, 
targeting, planning and conduct of future operations.’96 ES 
is utilized to monitor, identify, locate, and derive 
actionable intelligence about adversaries through the use of 
electromagnetic sensors, both in the communication and non-
communication bands. EA is more is terms of denying the use 
of the electromagnetic spectrum to adversaries for their 
communication and control.  
3. Computer Network Operations (minus Computer 
Network Defense) 
Computer Network Operations (CNO) are described as 
operations to attack, deceive, degrade, disrupt, deny, 
exploit, and defend electronic information and 
                     
94 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of 
Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001, as Amended through 30 May 
2008, p. 180. 
95 Ibid., pp. 178-179. 
96 Ibid., p. 180. 
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infrastructure. CNO is divided into three major components: 
computer network defense (CND), which is a component of the 
Information Protection Functional Coordination Cell, 
computer network attack (CNA), ‘Actions taken through the 
use of computer networks to disrupt, deny, degrade, or 
destroy information resident in computers and computer 
networks, or the computers and networks themselves,’97 and 
computer network exploitation (CNE), ‘Enabling operations 
and intelligence collection capabilities conducted through 
the use of computer networks to gather data from target or 
adversary automated information systems or networks.’98 CNA 
is comprised of all destructive and disruptive actions, 
while CNE involves enabling operations and intelligence 
collection capabilities through the use of networks and 
information systems. The information in today’s information 
age resides on information systems and flows on the 
information networks. The ability to regulate information on 
closed systems is still an achievable action, but regulation 
of the same on global open systems like the Internet is 
almost impossible in the present context.  
C. INFORMATION PROTECTION FUNCTIONAL COORDINATION CELL 
The primary staff responsibility for the conduct of the 
Information Protection functional cell is the G/S-6 
Communications Officer within the Network Operations Cell. 
The staff proponents and capabilities of the Information 
Protection Cell include: 
                     
97 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of 
Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001, as Amended through 30 May 
2008, p. 112. 
98 Ibid., p. 112. 
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1. Information Assurance 
Information Assurance (IA) is defined as ‘Measures that 
protect and defend information and information systems by 
ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, 
confidentiality, and non-repudiation. This includes 
providing for restoration of information systems by 
incorporating protection, detection, and reaction 
capabilities.’ IA is part of the defensive mechanism 
necessary for protection of information systems. 
2. Computer Network Defense 
As part of Computer Network Operations (CNO), Computer 
Network Defense (CND) involves ‘Actions taken to protect, 
monitor, analyze, detect, and respond to unauthorized 
activity within the Department of Defense information 
systems and computer networks.’99 
The military information infrastructure is vulnerable 
to actions by terrorists largely due to the target size 
involved, as well as a triggering-effect that may be caused 
by an action and its flow on interconnected global networks; 
CND, therefore, assumes considerable significance. 
3. Electronic Protection 
Electronic Protection (EP) is the ‘Division of 
electronic warfare involving actions taken to protect 
personnel, facilities, and equipment from any effects of 
 
                     
99 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of 
Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001, as Amended through 30 May 
2008, p. 112. 
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friendly or enemy use of the electromagnetic spectrum that 
degrade, neutralize, or destroy friendly combat 
capability.’100 
D. OPERATIONS SECURITY FUNCTIONAL COORDINATION CELL 
The primary staff responsibility for the conduct of the 
Operations Security functional cell is the G/S-3 Operations 
Officer with G/S-2 Intelligence Officer support within the 
protection cell. The staff proponents and capabilities of 
the Operations Security Cell include: 
1. Operations Security 
Operations Security (OPSEC) is defined as ‘A process of 
identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing 
friendly actions attendant to military operations and other 
activities to: a. identify those actions that can be 
observed by adversary intelligence systems; b. determine 
indicators that hostile intelligence systems might obtain 
that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive 
critical information in time to be useful to adversaries; 
and c. select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce 
to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly 
actions to adversary exploitation.’101  
2. Physical Security 
Physical security is defined as ‘That part of security 
concerned with physical measures designed to safeguard 
                     
100 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of 
Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001, as Amended through 30 May 
2008, p. 179. 
101 Ibid., p. 401. 
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personnel; to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, 
installations, material, and documents; and to safeguard 
them against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft.’ 
Physical security contributes towards OPSEC and MILDEC.  
3. Counterintelligence 
Counterintelligence (CI) is defined as ‘Information 
gathered and activities conducted to protect against 
espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or 
assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign 
governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or 
foreign persons, or international terrorist activities.’102 
Counterintelligence is an essential element of antiterrorism 
and counterterrorism procedures and forms part of both 
defensive and offensive measures against terrorist 
organizations and networks. 
E. MILITARY DECEPTION FUNCTIONAL COORDINATION CELL 
The primary staff responsibility for the conduct of the 
Military Deception functional cell is the G/S-5 Plans 
Officer within the plans cell. The staff proponents and 
capabilities of the Military Deception Cell could include a 
cross-section of the entire staff, as MILDEC operations are 
planned and subjected to the same operations process as 
legitimate operations. 
                     
102 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of 
Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001, as Amended through 30 May 
2008, p. 129. 
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1. Military Deception 
Military Deception (MILDEC) is defined as ‘Actions 
executed to deliberately mislead adversary military decision 
makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and 
operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific 
actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the 
accomplishment of the friendly mission.’103 
MILDEC in the information domain is quite different 
from the traditional or conventional MILDEC that involved 
the fusing of deception with physical tangibles on the 
ground; in the information age, MILDEC may achieve success 
by shaping the information without too much reliance on 
commensurate actions in the physical domain. This ability to 
move away from traditional employment of MILDEC will truly 
allow it to be integrated in information operation campaigns 
against terrorist organizations and networks. The importance 
of understanding the adversary’s ‘collection systems and 
sensors,’ to absorb deception, and to correctly assess their 
attitudes and reactions, is an essential ingredient for a 
successful MILDEC operation. 
F. CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS 
Civil-Military Operations is conspicuously omitted as a 
member of its sensible position in the Information 
Engagement Cell, the cell charged with “influencing foreign 
audiences.” This omission has not been explained in the 
doctrine or otherwise. Civil-Military Operations (CMO) are 
                     
103 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of 
Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001, as Amended through 30 May 
2008, p. 341. 
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defined as ‘The activities of a commander that establish, 
maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military 
forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian 
organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in 
a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to 
facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve 
operational US objectives.’104 Civil-Military Operations are 
conducted across the range of military operations over all 
phases - starting from the preparatory phase, through to the 
stabilization and reconstruction phase. 
 
                     
104 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of 
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